PAPER NO. 101

RATIONAL PRESUPPOSITIONALISM

Critically Examining Assumptions for Meaning

Rational Presuppositionalism is an epistemological method used to settle philosophical disputes by critically analyzing assumptions for meaning. It applies reason as a test for meaning to what is presupposed in a dispute.

Rational Presuppositionalism (RP) affirms that some things are clear. The basic things are clear. The basic things about God and man and good and evil are clear to reason. RP is an answer to skepticism and fideism. It is an alternative to rationalism and to empiricism, both of which make uncritically held assumptions.

Thinking is presuppositional. We think of the less basic in light of the more basic. We think of truth in light of meaning, experience in light of basic belief, conclusions in light of premises, and the finite and temporal in light of the infinite and eternal. If we understand what is more basic, we can understand what is less basic; if we agree on what is more basic, we can agree on what is less basic.

RP seeks to avoid needless disputes by examining if there is agreement on what is more basic. It seeks to avoid straining at gnats while swallowing camels. It looks at both the objective and the subjective aspects of knowledge and dialogue. Dialogue presupposes a commitment to reason along with an understanding of the nature of reason.

Having knowledge presupposes a concern to know, which presupposes integrity as a concern for consistency, both theoretically and personally. If there is commitment to reason, with integrity, disputes can be settled.

Skepticism claims that knowledge is not possible. It is rooted in uncritically held assumptions, that if rationalism (for example, Descartes) and empiricism (for example, Hume) cannot give knowledge, then no knowledge is possible. Consistently held, skepticism leads to nihilism, in which no distinction is clear, including the distinction of a and non-a, being and non-being, true and false, and good and evil.

Skepticism denies reason, makes dialogue impossible, and leads to silence as well as a cessation of all thought. It dissolves the meaning of its terms—knowledge and possible. Pragmatism cannot overcome the meaninglessness of skepticism. And fideism (appeal to faith apart from proof based on understanding) becomes an arbitrary affirmation of one view from among many.

RP affirms that sense experience gives knowledge of appearance but not of reality, and that the data of experience (common sense, scientific or mystical) must be interpreted in order to be meaningful. RP does not allow the post-modern skeptical view that “it is all a matter of interpretation.” Philosophy does not end with interpretation but begins here.

Every interpretation can be, and must be, tested for coherence and meaning. RP affirms that the self-evident truths of rationalism (Descartes’ cogito or Jefferson’s self-evident truths) are not logically basic, even though they are taken as properly basic. The alternatives of absolute idealism and naturalism require a response.

Rational Presuppositionalism is to be distinguished from fideistic presuppositionalism, in which one moves from Scripture (the Triune God of the Bible) to reason. RP is to be distinguished from axiomatic presuppositionalism, in which one begins with the Scripture as one’s set of axioms.

RP is to be distinguished from reformed epistemology in which one begins with what is taken as properly basic beliefs. RP is to be distinguished from evidentialism in which one seeks to argue from miracles to God. RP is to be distinguished from common sense realism in which the objective existence of the external world is assumed.

RP affirms that the clarity of general revelation is necessary for the inexcusability of unbelief and undertakes to show what is clear from general revelation by showing the alternatives of unbelief are contrary to reason. It is to be distinguished from all attempts to answer historical criticism of the Scriptures without first establishing the clarity of general revelation.

RP begins with an affirmation of the nature of reason based on the reality of thought. Reason is to be defined in itself, in its use, and in us.

Reason in itself is the laws of thought. Most basically, these are the law of identity: a is a; the law of non-contradiction: not both a and non-a, in the same respect and at the same time; and the law of excluded middle: either a or non-a. Other laws of thought are based on these laws. To doubt these laws is to lose all distinctions and to cease to think.

Reason in its use is formative, critical, interpretive, and constructive. Reason is used to form concepts, judgments and arguments, which are the forms of all thought. Whenever there are thoughts, reason is being used formatively. Reason is used critically, as a test for meaning. It is applied especially to basic beliefs as a test for meaning. If a belief, upon analysis, violates a law of thought, it lacks meaning and cannot be true. Reason is used to interpret experience in light of one’s basic beliefs. No experience is meaningful without interpretation, and every interpretation can and must be tested for meaning. And lastly, reason is used to construct a coherent world and life view upon one’s basic belief. Worldviews are manifest in cultures. They are held more or less consciously and more or less consistently and therefore continually face the internal and external challenges of reason.

Reason is always being used formatively. It is often used constructively, without first being used critically. It is sometimes used interpretively without realizing it. Reason in itself is not fallible, but a person may fail to use reason critically and fully.

Reason does not succeed only if it persuades subjectively, but if it answers objections with an objectively sound argument. Many objections against reason and rationalism are really against what amounts to a failure to use reason. Reason in itself must therefore be distinguished from reason in its use.

Reason in us is natural, ontological, transcendental, and fundamental.

Reason is natural, not conventional. It is universal, the same in all persons. Reason as the laws of thought is the common ground among all thinkers. What distinguishes us is not reason, but the willingness to use reason. What distinguishes us is not our assumption, but the willingness to critically examine our assumption for meaning.

Reason is ontological. It applies to being as well as to thought. There are no square-circles, no uncaused events, no being from non-being. It applies to all being, including the highest being. God is not both eternal and not eternal at the same time and in the same respect. Matter is not both extended and not extended at the same time and in the same respect. There is no noumenal realm or dimension in which reason does not apply, but to which faith gives access. While the mysteries of faith do not originate in reason, they do not go against reason. Miracles are not against the laws of reason, but against a law of nature. Reason, as an aspect of God’s being, is eternal. The laws of nature are created. Paradoxes are puzzling to reason insofar as assumptions present and at work are not yet critically examined and corrected. Finite beings cannot have exhaustive or comprehensive knowledge of anything, but the unknown is not against the laws of reason.

Reason is transcendental. It is authoritative and self-attesting. It is transcendental in that it stands above thought and makes thought possible. It cannot be questioned but makes questioning possible. Statements about general and special revelation (Scripture) can and must be questioned, by reason, but reason itself as the laws of thought cannot be questioned. As transcendental, it cannot be argued for, even in a circular manner. In thought, what is of highest authority is self-attesting, and only reason is self-attesting. Scripture assumes reason as that by which scripture is to be understood. Scripture, if it is to be received, must be spoken in the name of God, that is, it must be consistent with the nature of God know from general revelation. There is not and cannot be any conflict between reason, general revelation, and Scripture. Scripture is set against all others forms of special revelation, not against reason and general revelation.

Reason is fundamental. It is fundamental to other aspects of human personality. Feelings are directed by belief about the good, and thought and feeling move the will to act. Feeling and will are not independent of or contrary to belief. Conflicts within the understanding are manifest in conflicts in feeling and will. Unnoticed, these misunderstandings, as conflicts within our thoughts, lead to apparent conflict between thought and feeling. Our deepest need is for meaning. Our deepest misery is in the awareness of the lack of meaning. Meaninglessness is a fundamental aspect of spiritual death, and, sometimes, physical death is sought as an escape from spiritual death. Boredom comes from meaninglessness, in which the creation, apart from or in place of the creator, cannot satisfy. Failure to be rational is experienced as guilt, from which escape is sought in the unending rationalizations of self-justification. Our greatest happiness is from the use of reason in understanding the creation, when this understanding leads to the knowledge of God.

The first application of RP is to the question what is real? It clarifies the subjective factors of integrity and commitment to reason as preconditions to knowledge. It prevents further discussion which would be fruitless if these preconditions are not in place.

We begin with the question what is real? because existence is our most basic concept, and eternal existence (without beginning) is more basic than temporal existence (with beginning).

To show that some is eternal is true, we show that the contradiction none is eternal cannot be true. None is eternal implies that all is temporal, all had a beginning, all came into being. If all came into being, it would have come into being from non-being, which is impossible.

Hence, none is eternal cannot be true and its contradiction some is eternal must be true. All came into being from non-being is not the same as creation ex nihilo, in which God is eternal and acted to create.

By non-being is meant the absence of all being whatsoever, not just the absence of all visible being. An unending series of finite and temporal beings having the power to create ex nihilo, is not an objection that has been (or, upon analysis, can be) made.

If it is agreed that it is clear to reason that there must be something eternal, we can go on to the next step in showing what is clear (see Paper No. 102).


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