PAPER NO. 78

MATERIAL MONISM

  1. Material monism is the ontological position that there is only one kind of substance or being (monism), that this substance is material, and that this substance is eternal. According to materialist cosmology, all phenomena can (and must) be explained in physical or material terms. Contrast this with spiritual monism, dualism and theism.
  2. Materialist lifestyles differ according to social-economic background, degree of rational consistency and personality disposition. Socio-economic: dropouts, blue collar, bourgeois, professional, epicurean (refined version of materialism—fine things in life). Personality: instinctual primitivism, secular humanism, mystical materialism.
  3. Materialism arose out of a desire for explanation in reaction to excess and failure in supernatural explanations. In ancient Greece, the Milesians (Pre-Socratics) replaced the superstitions of finite gods depicted in popular religion (myths and epics) with natural explanations. In the modern world, religious strife and otherworldliness lead to the rejection of popular and Historic Christianity in favor of deism at first, and later naturalism. As overextended natural explanations fail, the culture swings back without reflection to the antinomy of overextended supernaturalism.
  4. Given the assumption that all is matter, certain implications follow necessarily. Consider the following: the origin of the cosmos, the origin of life, the destiny of man, human equality, the origin of thought, the good, freedom, rationality, and political authority. These are important parts of a materialist worldview and answers are derived by reason seeking consistency and are not and cannot be a matter of experience.
  5. The first argument against materialism is based on the relation of the most fundamental feature of the physical universe (change) and our most basic concept (eternal).

major premise: if the material world were eternal, it would be self-maintaining

minor premise: the material world is not self-maintaining

conclusion: the material world is not eternal

Is this argument sound: Is it valid and are the premises true?

This argument is modus tollens, and is valid.

  1. The major premise assumes:

    1. There must be something eternal and what is eternal is not dependent on anything for its continuing existence. If all is matter, then matter must be eternal.
    2. If something is self-maintaining, it will continue without any change, or if it changes it is a matter of recycling.
  2. There are no unique events in an eternal being (see Paper No. 76).
  3. The reason for the minor premise:

    1. In general:

      1. The physical universe is highly differentiated in terms of hot and cold.
      2. These differences interact.
      3. The interaction continues until sameness is reached.
      4. Sameness remains sameness—it cannot return to differentiation.
    2. In its parts: the sun (and all stars) will burn out:

      1. The sun is finite in size.
      2. The sun is giving off heat.
      3. Being finite, this process cannot go on forever. Therefore, the sun and stars will burn out.
    3. As a whole:

A materialist response has been an appeal to the big bang oscillating universe theory.

The non-materialist reply is:

  1. On empirical grounds, there is not enough matter in the physical universe for gravity to pull everything back together (need about 10x as much).
  2. On logical grounds, the model of the big bang does not overcome the problem of entropy (sameness). At some point the force pulling in will have to equal the force pushing out.
  3. In the true vacuum to false vacuum theory of the beginning of the universe, when the true vacuum is described as empty of matter and energy in contrast to the false vacuum as empty of matter but not energy, the change so described involves being coming into existence from non-being. How can you go from a position where you have no energy to having energy?

The reason for the minor premise is not overcome by appeal to black holes, antimatter, antiuniverses, etc.

  1. To explain change and diversity from an original unity and oneness in materialists’ terms has often involved appeal to uncaused events:

    1. Epicurus (300 BC)—the atomic swerve theory (atoms ran into other atoms and developed material)
    2. Dirac (1930)—evenly heated vacuum theory
    3. Hoyle (1950)—the steady state theory (atoms kind of giving birth to other atoms)
    4. B. Russell (1960)—cold ash heap view (the universe will end in a cold heap and run down)
    5. Currently widespread—the big bang oscillating universe theory
    6. S. Hawking and others (1980)—true vacuum/false vacuum theory
    7. Historically, appeals have been made to something non-material to account for change in light of the difficulties in materialists’ explanations (e.g., Aristotle’s dualistic view of a Prime Mover)
  2. Non-Materialist: appeal to an uncaused event violates the laws of reason.

Materialist: why should reason be an absolute; reason itself evolves as man evolves.

Non-Materialist: if reason is not absolute, then “all is matter” is not rationally true; its logical opposite is not false if it is true; both may be true at the same time.

Materialist: “all is matter” is pragmatically true; it works for me.

Non-Materialist: what works (satisfies) is a statement about one’s feelings, not about what is real.

Materialist: about what is real I make no statement (c.f. Sextus Empiricus’ move to silence (gave up reason)).

Non-Materialist: as rational beings we cannot give up reason; we can only give up integrity.

  1. The second argument against materialism is based on the reality of thought that must be explained in terms of materialism. (How can chemistry explain thinking?)

major premise: if all is matter, then thinking must be motion of atoms in the brain

minor premise: thinking is not motion of atoms in the brain

conclusion: it is not the case that all is matter

The argument must be tested for soundness: Is it valid? Are the premises true?

  1. The reason for the minor premise:

Motion of atoms can be described in terms of fast or slow, straight or curved, up or down, etc. None of these qualities or combinations can be identified as true or false which is an essential quality of thought. Therefore, thinking is not motion of any kind. In thinking, we have concepts which are meaningful or not; judgments which are true or false; and arguments which are valid/sound or not. The argument above is saying that thinking is motion. Do they share the same qualities?

  1. Reducing thought to motion is one form of reductionism. Historically, attempts were made to reduce space to number, force to space, chemistry to physics, biology to chemistry, etc. The distinctiveness of the diverse aspects of reality has asserted itself in each case. Other attempts to reduce thought to non-rational categories are:

Marx: a person’s belief is determined by class-consciousness based on economic factors.

Freud: a person’s belief is based on psychological factors originating in early childhood.

Skinner: a person’s belief is based on conditioning by pleasure/pain stimuli.

Whenever a reductionist theory is applied to itself in order to see if it can be justified, the result is a dissolving of the very possibility of any rational justification whatsoever. In effect, epistemologically reductionist theories are moves that abandon reason. The three examples cited are explicit in their materialist assumption.

  1. The third argument against materialism is based on the problem of perception. The materialist maintains that belief in the reality of the physical world is a matter of immediate perception, whereas belief in spirit has no such support in experience. The many common claims to experience of a non-physical reality can be more convincingly explained in materialistic terms.

The non-materialist reply is that in looking for spirit, one has to know what one is looking for in order to know where and how to look. If spirit exists at all, I would have a spirit or be a spirit. I could not have a spirit without knowing it. In looking for spirit, one is looking for something so constantly obvious that one is likely to overlook it.

The third argument against materialism:

major premise: the most immediately known is the most certainly known

minor premise: the self is most immediately known

conclusion: the self is most certainly known

Is this argument sound?

  1. The reason for the minor premise is based on the analysis of “immediately” perceived. Perception of the table is analyzed in terms of light waves, neural impulses, mental image and self as perceiver of the mental image.

    1. Light waves are said to be more immediate than the (cause of the) table that I see. But light waves are not seen, nor are they conceived to be in the shape of the table that I see.
    2. Neural impulses are formed from light waves interacting with the optic nerves. They are more immediate than light waves, yet they too are not seen nor conceived to be in the shape of the table I see. Since neural impulses are the last brain activity, one has to go beyond neural impulses and the brain to get to the table that is seen.
    3. Where is the table that is seen? It cannot conceivably be in the brain, but must be a mental image in the mind.  Finally, the mental image does not perceive itself or another mental image and it changes continually (many), but I am immediately aware that I am the perceiver (one) of all the mental images. I am other than the mental images and know myself as consciousness itself, having no physical characteristic. This consciousness is also known as mind, self, soul, or spirit. This consciousness is so constantly present, that it is not noticed without deliberate attention.
  2. The objections to the minor premise retrace the steps in the reason for the minor premise by attempting to reduce the self to mental images, and then either show mental state terms are dispensable or can be identified indirectly with a physical reality.

    1. Hume: when I look inside I see no self but only various mental images; if there is a self, it must be a bundle of mental images.

Response: what is doing the looking?

  1. Analytical behaviorism: mental state terms can be analyzed completely into statements containing only behavior terms. Consider pain and pain behavior. On this principle any distinction between animal, artificial and human intelligence is denied.

Response: contradictory beliefs are compatible with the same behavior, so the meaning of the belief cannot be analyzed in terms of behavior; e.g., “x believes there is a fire nearby” and “x does not believe there is a fire nearby” as in meditative self-immolation.

  1. Neutral identity thesis: while pain cannot be directly identified with a physical fiber, both can be identified with a neutral third—fibain. The very thing (fibain) that is aching unbearably (pain) is conducting nerve impulses (fiber).

Response: this works for non-essential properties but not for essential properties. For example, the very thing that has no size (pain) has size (fiber). No neutral thing can have these properties at once.

[If what is known immediately is mental, the problem is to avoid idealism which says there is no material world. This can be done by analyzing the cause of what is seen.]

This paper was originally developed for an Introduction to Philosophy course.


© 1992 Logos Papers Press